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 An analysis of technical guidance for cybersecurity of ISO 80001-2-8 is presented 
 ISO 80001-2-8 technical security controls have significant gaps in areas 
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ABSTRACT 
Medical devices, in the case of malfunction, can have tangible impact on patient safety. Their 
security, in a world where the Internet of Things has become a reality, is paramount to the 
continued safety of patients that are dependent upon these devices. The international standard 
ISO/IEC 80001 - Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices 
presents a unified and amalgamated approach to the safety of medical devices connected to IT 
networks. Whilst this standard presents a guide for security and risk management in health delivery 
organisations, its effectiveness with regard to contemporary cybersecurity is unknown.  
This research employed a structured review process to compare and analyse the ISO/IEC 80001 
technical controls standards (ISO/IEC 80001-2-2 and ISO/IEC 80001-2-8), with contemporary 
cybersecurity best practice, guidelines and standards. The research deconstructed the technical 
controls and drew links between these standards and cybersecurity best practice to assess the level 
of harmonisation. Subsequently, a deeper analysis identified the areas of omission, coverage, 
addition or improvement that may impact the effectiveness of ISO/IEC 80001 to provide effective 
cybersecurity protection. 
ISO/IEC 80001 aims to provide a minimal level of cybersecurity however this research demonstrates 
that there are deficiencies in the standard and identifies the important aspects of cybersecurity that 
could be improved. This situation has arisen due to the rapidly evolving nature of the cybersecurity 
environment and the protracted time to revise and republish international standards. This research 
identified several areas that require urgent consideration, including Emergency Access, Health Data 
De-Identification, Physical Locks on Devices, Data Backup, Disaster Recovery, Third-Party 
Components in Product Lifecycle Roadmap, Transmission Confidentiality, and Transmission Integrity. 
The research will provide health delivery organisations implementing ISO/IEC 80001, assurance as to 
the level of protection supplied by the ISO/IEC 80001 standard, and the areas that may need 
enhancement to increase cybersecurity protection and consequently increase in patient safety. 












as the findings from this research are being provided to the International Organisations for 
Standardisation, TC215 Health Informatics, Joint Working Group 7, to inform the review of ISO/IEC 
80001 currently in progress.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The international community has long recognised that introducing medical devices into hospital IT 
networks brings additional risks to the devices as well as the networks on which they operate 
(Grimes, 2011). ISO/IEC 80001 - Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating 
medical devices presents a unified and amalgamated approach to the safety of medical devices 
connected to IT networks. This approach was created by unifying existing standards, and 
amalgamating these with risk management techniques and technical controls.  As medical devices 
can have real impact on patient safety should they malfunction, their security in a world where the 
Internet of Things has become a reality, is paramount to the continued safety of patients that are 
dependent upon these devices (Eagles, 2008).  This issue is compounded by the increasingly blurred 
line between software and hardware, resulting in increased complexity of managing such devices 
(Williams & McCauley, 2016).  
Most medical devices contain embedded software, and devices range from implantable pacemakers 
and anaesthesiology monitoring equipment, to fitness accessories like the Fitbit. Given that many 
clinically-based devices may directly impact patient safety, the creation and subsequent 
implementation of a framework that sets specific values for acceptable levels of security is needed.  
Further, as many ‘medical networks’ are a standard corporate network with a multitude of medical 
devices attached to them, a piecemeal approach to addressing cybersecurity threats will leave 
exploitable gaps in any security measures (Fonash & Schneck, 2015). 
ISO/IEC 80001 is a multipart standard for the protection of medical devices on networks using risk 
assessment techniques. It is comprised of two parts:  
1. ISO/IEC 80001: Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical 
devices -- Part 1: Roles, responsibilities and activities in10 sub-parts, dealing s with risk 
management techniques, guidelines and processes; and  
2. ISO/IEC 80001: Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical 
devices -- Part 2-1: Step by Step Risk Management of Medical IT-Networks; Practical 
Applications and Examples in 9 sub-parts dealing with technical controls and specifications 
to support the implementation of ISO/IEC 80001-1.   
This sub-parts cover guidance for specific risk management aspects and strategies. The sub-parts 












 ISO/IEC 80001-2-8: Application guidance -- Guidance on standards for establishing the 
security capabilities identified in IEC 80001-2-2, which maps and translates the presented 
capabilities from ISO/IEC 80001–- 2-2: Guidance for the communication of medical device 
security needs, risks and controls into implementable technical security controls.   
ISO/IEC 80001-2-8 derives its controls from a ‘what should be in place’ perspective, and this provides 
an implementation guide for articulating the security capabilities from ISO/IEC 80001-2-2. The 
intended outcome of ISO/IEC 80001-2-8 is to provide a minimum required level of security for health 
delivery organisations.  However, it does not assess the ability of the security controls to protect 
against cybersecurity incidents.  
 
Figure 1 provides the context of the research in relation to existing parts of ISO/IEC 80001, based on 
and extrapolated from ISO/IEC 80001-2-2 and ISO/IEC 80001-2-8. What differentiates this research 
from ISO/IEC 80001-2-8 is the perspective taken to analyse the standards and best practice. This 
research takes ISO/IEC 80001-2-8 and analyses the suggested security controls from a cybersecurity 
perspective. In doing this, it identifies the omissions, gaps, and the strength of the standards 
suggested minimum level of security against contemporary cybersecurity best practice in an evolving 
threat environment.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Position of this research in the context of ISO/IEC 80001. 
 
 
To date, there is no measure of the effectiveness of ISO/IEC 80001 implementations to provide 
protective assurance against cybersecurity incidents. This research contributes to addressing this 
issue.  
1.1 BACKGROUND 
There is an increase in the use of devices that are attached to medical IT networks, including medical 
devices and wireless mobile technologies (Cooper & Fuchs, 2013). While all medical devices require 
jurisdictional approval, for instance, the US has the Federal Drug Administrations (FDA) and Australia 
has the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), they are rarely tested from a cybersecurity 
systematic perspective upon integration into a medical IT network.  The international standard 
ISO/IEC 80001 is designed to assist organisations with the integration of medical devices into 
medical IT networks.  The standard is risk based, and is segmented into 10 parts to address the 
broad areas of safety and effectiveness, together with data and system security. To facilitate this, 
the standard presents 19 security capabilities. These capabilities are outlined in ISO/IEC 80001-2-2 












Capability Name Acronym 
Automatic Log-off ALOF 
Audit AUDT 
Authorization AUTH 
Configuration of Security Features CNFS 
Cybersecurity Product Upgrade CSUP 
Health Data De-Identification DIDT 
Data Backup and Recovery DTBK 
Emergency Access EMRG 
Health Data Integrity and Authenticity IGAU 
Malware Detection and Prevention MLDP 
Node Authentication NAUT 
Personal Authentication PAUT 
Physical Locks and Devices PLOK 
Third-Party Components in Product 
Lifecycle Roadmaps 
RDMP 
Software and Application Hardening SAHD 
Security Guidelines SCUD 
Health Data Storage and Confidentiality STCF 
Transmission Confidentiality TXCF 
Transmission Integrity TCIG 
Table 1 – List of Security Capabilities (ISO/IEC 80001-2-2) 
Complementing this is implementation guidance in ISO/IEC 80001-2-8, which includes specific 
actions to take and expected results.  ISO/IEC 80001-2-2 and ISO/IEC 80001-2-8 detail how to assess 
risks associated with medical device usage and implement controls balanced across the 19 security 
capabilities. 
1.2 PROBLEM  
The effectiveness of the 19 security capabilities in ISO/IEC 80001-2-2, and the technical guidance in 
ISO/IEC 80001-2-8 to provide practical cybersecurity protection, is unknown.  As such, an analysis of 
the technical controls and guidance provided by ISO/IEC 80001-2-8 aligned with the 19 security 
capabilities allows for the identification of the areas of coverage, omission and improvement when 
viewing these controls with a cybersecurity outlook.  The logical question of “how secure is the 
medical device” (Mankovich & Fitzgerald, 2011) is not one that the ISO/IEC 80001 standard seeks to 
answer, instead it looks to manage the risk associated with the usage of that device. This paper 
analyses the guidance provided by ISO/IEC 80001-2-2 and 2-8, in order to ascertain the level of 
completeness with regards to contemporary cybersecurity best practice. 
2 METHODOLOGY 
The following section details the theory supporting the research and the research design. 
2.1 METHODOLOGY SELECTION 
This research used information systems theory (Figure 2) to understand the interplay between 
different information systems, security standards, industry based practical guidelines, 












As the research is concerned with medical IT networks and the effectiveness of the ISO/IEC 80001 
series in minimising risk from cybersecurity incidents, the research needed to examine the 
information system components comprising of interaction between the human (processes), the 
technical aspects and the environment of context.  
 
 
Figure 2. A Model of the Discipline of Information Systems (Shanks et al, 1993) 
 
Exploratory research is the systematic usage of knowledge to generate new knowledge (Nunamaker 
& Chen, 1990). This research was both exploratory and applied, as the analysis of the effectiveness 
of the ISO/IEC 80001 cybersecurity controls takes the interpretations generated to extend the 
existing knowledge base.  This was undertaken by answering the following questions: 
1.) To what extent does ISO/IEC 80001 support contemporary best practice in cybersecurity 
protection? 
2.) What recommendations can be made for improved protection from cybersecurity incidents 
using ISO/IEC 80001?  
 
The approach employed a structured review of the existing standards, with specific focus on 
practical implementations and cybersecurity operations. This review analysed the existing standards 
by deconstructing them into constituent parts, then analysing the controls presented in each of the 
19 security capabilities in order to ascertain correlations, coverage, omissions, gaps and 
improvement. This approach was selected as each standard is both an individual document and part 
of a larger whole.  When examining the ISO/IEC 80001 standard it is important to understand how 
each individual segment of the standard fits into an overall system to be able to draw 
comprehensive practical conclusions. 
Figure 3 illustrates the research design. The research was constructed in two distinct phases, 
cybersecurity framework analysis (Phase 1) and ISO/IEC 80001 analysis (Phase 2). Phase 1 was 
further sub divided into two concurrent activities:  an analysis of cybersecurity frameworks, and an 
analysis of ISO/IEC 80001-2-2 and 2-8. The cybersecurity framework analysis identified common 














Figure 3. Research design  
2.2 PHASE 1: ANALYSE CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORKS. 
Phase 1 analysed the contemporary cybersecurity standards and guidelines to compile a list of 
techniques, guidelines and practices. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 
800-53 document was selected as a common and mandated standard for federal usage in the US, 
and has also seen adaptation and adoption around the world. This document is risk-based, allowing 
for more direct correlation between this standard and the ISO/IEC 80001 prescribed controls. This 
was supplemented with the Penetration Testing Execution Standard Technical Guidelines (PTES, 
2012), which was selected for the comprehensive and detailed information it provides. Further, the 












these guidelines lead industry best practice for performing penetration testing, and thus allow for an 
external viewpoint for correlation. Such correlation is important as a baseline for cybersecurity best 
practice, as well as a measure of the strength of the controls under examination. Lastly, to ensure 
complete cross referencing with other ISO standards used in the development of ISO/IEC 80001, the 
following standards are also used as they were specifically referenced in ISO/IEC 80001-2-8: 
- ISO/IEC 15408-2 Information Technology – Security Techniques – Evaluation Criteria for IT 
Security – Part 2: Security Functional Components (ISO/IEC 15408-2). 
- ISO/IEC 15408-3 Information Technology – Security Techniques – Evaluation Criteria for IT 
Security – Part 3: Security Assurance Components (ISO/IEC 15408-3). 
- IEC 62443-3-3 Industrial communication networks- Networks and System security – Part 3-3: 
System security requirements and security levels (IEC 62443-3-3). 
- ISO 27002). Information technology - Security Techniques – Code of practice for information 
security controls (ISO 27002). 
- ISO 27799 Health informatics – information security managements in health using ISO/IEC 
27002 (ISO 27799) 
2.2.1 Phase 1: Analyse ISO/IEC 80001 standard.  
An analysis of each of the 19 security capabilities (ISO/IEC 80001-2-2) was undertaken to look for 
harmonisation between the technical controls presented in ISO 80001-2-2 and 2-8. This also 
identified possible areas of omission, coverage, improvement and addition. Each of the 19 
capabilities draws technical controls from five separate standards – SP 800-53, ISO/IEC 15408-3, IEC 
62443-3-3, ISO/IEC 27002 and ISO 27799.  This resulted in diagrams of varying complexity with the 
interlinking controls mapped and identified. Figure 4 is the template used to generate the 
harmonisation mapping.  
 
 
Figure 4. Harmonisation mapping template 
 
The template in Figure 4 is used as follows:  
1. The Security Capability Full Name and Acronym are directly linked to the 19 security 
capabilities that are presented in ISO 80001-2-2.   
2. The ISO 80001-2-2 Standard presents Requirement Goals and associated User Needs, which 
are presented under the ISO/IEC 80001-2-2 sub heading, and are analyzed for interlinkages. 
3. The user needs are compared to the technical controls, as they are more finely grained than 












4. The ISO/IEC 80001-2-8 Standard pulls technical controls from multiple standards – each 
standard has its own column.  These controls are marked with interlinkages, and are 
sometimes relatable directly to a user need.  
 
 
2.2.2 Phase 1: Collate security framework principles.  
To ascertain a baseline level of best practice for cybersecurity protection, the common outcomes, 
goals and techniques were collated from the selected documents (SP 800-53, PTES and PTF).  This 
resulted in a baseline for which comparison and analysis could be made between prescribed 
technical controls present within ISO 80001-2-8 and contemporary cybersecurity best practice. This 
baseline was achieved by examination of the principles used in cybersecurity best practice and those 
that applied to medical device security.  
2.3 PHASE 2: CONTRAST ISO STANDARD OUTCOMES TO CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORKS 
Phase 2 compares and contrasts ISO/IEC 80001-2-2 and 2-8 standard with the Phase 1 output.  This 
comparison identified the areas of the standard that appear effective from a cybersecurity 
perspective, as well as those that could be improved with further explanation, or have gaps 
compared to the security framework and principles.  Lastly, recommendations from the detailed 
analysis were devised and provided to the international standards community via the ISO Joint 
Working Group 7, for consideration in the current review and revision of the ISO/IEC 80001 series. 
 
This comparison resulted in a set of tables synthesised from the analysis of identified principles and 
best practice with respect to the provided technical controls. This generated a mapping of technical 
controls to prescribed outcomes of the standards. The template of the analysis table that compared 
the extracted principles of these frameworks to the deconstruction of ISO/IEC 80001-2-2 and 2-8 is 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Template for Analysis Table 
3  RESULTS 
The results show each security capability in detail to identify the omissions and anomalies, and then 
provides a summary discussion based on the collation of these. 
Figure 5 is an example of the diagrams created for each of the 19 capability controls.  A full set of the 
deconstruction diagrams for the 19 security capabilities and associated analysis tables can be 
located at http://www.flinders.edu.au/digitalhealth/digitalhealth_resources.cfm.  






Positive points from analysis of ISO 80001-2-2 and 2-8 
 
Improvement 
Possible Areas of Improvement within the capability 
 
Confusing Controls  




The justification for the observations 
Analysis notes 






























Figure 5 is one of the 19 deconstruction diagrams created from Phase 1 of the research process that 
created a baseline of best practice for cybersecurity protection, and identified common outcomes, 
goals and techniques. 
Table 3 is one of the 19 analysis tables generated in Phase 2 of the research process. Using AUTH as 
the example, the table identifies the positive and improvable aspects of the technical control, 
together with extemporary notes and an assessment of the level of coverage the control provides 
from a contemporary cybersecurity perspective. A different example is used here, as the previous 
(ALOF) security capability does not present a sufficient coverage of the template. 
Table 3. Analysis Table for Authorization (AUTH) 
 
3.1 CAPABILITY-CONTROLS FINDINGS 
The results analysis table (as per the example in Table 3) provides the basis for the deductions and 
observations discussed below. This is reported by each of the 19 security capabilities, together with 
comment on the strength of the presented technical controls with respect to cybersecurity practical 
application, the issues identified with the capability, and the effectiveness in addressing practical 
cybersecurity protections.  
3.1.1 Automatic Logoff - ALOF 
The automatic logoff section draws from a well-established and robust area of cybersecurity.  As 
such, there are minimal issues with this control. However, the need to tailor the advice given to 
account for ‘real-life’ usage is needed.  In particular, the suggested screen timeout of 15-seconds to 
a minute is relatively short in elapsed time and could possibly impact the general usage of the device 
in a busy healthcare environment.  Health delivery organisations would need to be aware of the 
intended usage for each type of user and tailor their policy on automatic logoff to reflect this.  
Overall, this control is effective and robust with respect to cybersecurity.  
3.1.2 Audit - AUDT 
There is room for clarification as to which controls are required for performing successful audit 
activities together with possible examples. However, the defined overall controls are effective.  




Local or Directory Based 
Maps to existing standards (X.509) 
Touches on Least Access and Separation of Duties 
Network segregation is also mentioned 
Documented Operating procedure 
 
Improvement 
Nothing about severity or scaled security controls as 
dependent upon intended usage 
 








Separation of Duties 
Relaxing controls when 
there is “Adequate” 
physical security 
controls in place 
creates a false 
correlation between 
physical security and 
the ability to relax 
authorization. 
What is the baseline for 
deeming physical 
security ‘adequate’? 
Handling of assets  
Documented operating 
procedure could use a 




of physical security  
How assets should 
be handled 
Version or change 














3.1.3 Authorization - AUTH 
Authorization draws from mature and established security protocols and therefore provides 
effective protection. There is omission of a change control procedure for authorization of people and 
systems integration.  
3.1.4 Configuration of Security Features - CNFS 
Configuration of security features is one of the largest areas covered by the standard, and covers 
extensive technical ground.  This technical knowledge, along with the breadth and depth of required 
knowledge may create an issue for implementers without a comprehensive security background.  
Additional guidance on principles and goals of the standard may help alleviate this potential lack of 
knowledge.  The listed technical controls provide an effective baseline for configuration, dependent 
upon the implementer being able to utilise them effectively.  
3.1.5 Cybersecurity Product Upgrades - CSUP 
The configuration and management of cybersecurity upgrades is a common practice; however, the 
implementation nuances provide a substantial challenge. The logistical challenges of updating 
medical devices are unique to individual devices.  The effectiveness of the standard may be 
improved by providing a baseline workflow example that allows for a health delivery organisation to 
construct or mimic the management of this process.  With additional technical references and a 
higher level of harmonisation across standards, the effectiveness of this control can be increased 
without compromising the integrity of the standard. The reference to The OSI Guidelines for Security 
Vulnerability, Reporting and Response 2004 within the standard is contentious as the material is out 
of date by contemporary standards and practice in cybersecurity. This reference should be updated 
to a more recent standard that may consider revisions and discoveries that have occurred since 
publication. As international standards are designed to be platform agnostic, there is a conflict 
between the need for universally applicable guidance versus the technical information and guidance 
required to implement effective cybersecurity protections.    
3.1.6 Health Data De-Identification - DIDT 
Health Data De-Identification can be a problematic control as each health delivery organisation is 
required to conform to local legislative requirements.  As such, the need for specific guidance is 
difficult to fulfil.  The clarification of a reference stating pseudo-anonymization and its applicable 
use, while not directly affecting effectiveness, would create less confusion on why the standard is 
listed. This could be further improved by creating a workflow example as to how this de-
identification should proceed, as well as referencing additional applicable technical standards that 
may help clarify the salient points.  As the onus lies with the health delivery organisation and local 
regulations, this control is theoretically effective but difficult to implement. 
3.1.7 Data Backup and Disaster Recovery - DTBK 
Disaster Backup and Recovery is similar to Authentication, as a well-known and practiced 
cornerstone of cybersecurity, as well as a general good security practice.  However, this control 
suffers from a lack of depth in the technical controls provided.  There is a lack of advanced backup 
methods suggested as part of the technical controls. For example, there is no consideration and 
direction on the usage of criticality ranking to determine backup frequency, tiered backup systems 
and ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ sites. The addition of dedicated disaster recovery and backup standards would 
help alleviate this, as well as provide a more effective listing of controls and guidance. Clarification is 
also required for the definition of a ‘low powered’ device. As these devices are specifically 












preferable. This would also include the definition of the ‘timeframe’ stated within the standard for 
data retrieval from such devices, as this timeframe has neither explanation nor contextual advice.  
The listed technical controls are adequate and provide some measure of protection, however the 
area would benefit from more detailed guidance.   
3.1.8 Emergency Access - EMRG 
Emergency Access or ‘Break -Glass’, from a cybersecurity perspective, is a major vulnerability in any 
security system.  The ‘default’, or commonly used pre-staged accounts, complete with easy to 
remember passwords and usernames, goes against basic cybersecurity principles.  That these 
accounts usually compromise system or root level accounts, also exacerbates this risk.  Whilst some 
mitigation guidance is provided in the form of additional physical security to prevent misuse, the 
utilisation of additional auditing controls, and dedicated clean-up upon usage of these accounts, this 
does not aid in hardening the vulnerability that providing emergency access creates.   
The inclusion of the Break-Glass – An Approach to Granting Emergency Access to Healthcare Systems 
(Brucker & Petritsch, 2009) whitepaper on reactive break-glass access would provide an alternative 
method, utilising reactive group policy for access without the need for pre-staged accounts.  The use 
of this type of system would alleviate some of the security flaws that are present with of pre-staged 
accounts.  Ultimately, either system allows for an effective system for emergency access. 
3.1.9 Health Data Integrity and Authenticity - IGAU 
Maintaining the authenticity and integrity of health data is a multifaceted issue.  It requires proper 
authorisation and data control measures, and relies upon the health delivery organisation’s 
interpretation of the applicable legislation.  As such, the control is effective in the sense that it 
provides a basic frame of reference. However, it is still left to the health delivery organisation to 
identify the relevant controls as per their legal requirements.  
3.1.10 Malware Detection and Protection - MLDP 
The control provides an effective baseline for cybersecurity because of the mature nature of existing 
practice in this area.   As malware protection and detection is a key aspect of cybersecurity, the 
technical controls provided are well defined.  Clarification on the use of the term ‘safety’ is needed, 
as it does not specify if this relates to ‘patient safety’ or ‘cybersecurity safety’. It should be noted 
though that the need for high level technical knowledge in this control may lead to unintentional 
gaps in security. The addition of technical references or workflows that demonstrate a basic process, 
would allow for health delivery organisations to have a baseline that can then be customized to their 
needs.  
3.1.11 Node Authentication - NAUT 
To effectively analyse the connections between the controls, and make appropriate decisions on 
control requirements, it was necessary to further segment NAUT into: 
- Users and Accounts 
- Policy 
- Management and Administration 
- Auditing and Cryptography 
As the technical controls provided are extensive, identification of what they cover and their intended 
purpose of use was difficult to identify. Whilst the overall control is comprised of a core set of 












accredited to Node Authentication as a process.  This aside, the section benefits from the maturity of 
the authentication process.  
3.1.12 Personal Authentication - PAUT 
Given that this control is almost identical to NAUT, the question as to whether this is a needed 
control is raised.  The clarity and effectiveness may be enhanced by combining the two controls into 
Authentication, with Node and User controls listed as a sub-set.  
3.1.13 Physical Locks on Devices - PLOK 
The physical security controls suffer from a lack of specific guidance in implementation and makes a 
fundamentally flawed assumption that increased physical security leads to a decrease in the need 
for Authentication (AUTH). Whilst the technical controls listed supply ‘ideal’ outcomes, the omission 
of implementation specifics, such as the technologies to be used and suitable physical access 
methods, weakens the effectiveness of this area.  Overall the controls presented allow for an 
effective baseline of physical security, however improvements can be made by clarifying the ‘what’ 
and ‘how’ of the controls. Whilst this is at odds with a platform agnostic standard, the addition of 
dedicated physical security references would allow for this clarification whilst preserving the 
universal application of the standard. 
3.1.14 Third-Party Components in Product Lifecycle Roadmap - RDMP 
The management of third-party devices and software components presents a significant logistical 
challenge. Within complex networks the stated goals are quite broad, and whilst the technical 
controls are geared towards a process being created to manage the multitude of devices, there is 
nothing on which to base this process.  The inclusion of an example workflow that covers a basic 
lifecycle would provide a solid starting point which the health delivery organisation could tailor 
towards their specific needs.  This would further enhance this already effective control, leading to 
greater overall security.  
3.1.15 Software and Application Hardening - SAHD 
Software and application hardening is one of the broadest areas that cybersecurity is applied to, and 
as such requires extensive knowledge and time to apply effectively. While there is specific mention 
of medical devices and maintaining intended usage, there is no differentiation between the different 
types of software and hardware that may be present on a medical IT network.  The prescribed 
controls present an effective base level of security. The reliance upon the SP 800-53 standard can be 
identified as a weakness as an overreliance upon a single document. The result is still an effective 
listing of controls, as SP 800-53 is highly specialized.  
Additional information on more complicated aspects of SAHD would benefit the controls. For 
example, references to systematic testing guidelines. As with the MLDP control, the level of 
technical knowledge and expertise required to implement the controls is significant, and not every 
implementer will have these skills.  Even without additional clarification, this section is still effective 
at providing a baseline of cybersecurity protection. 
3.1.16 Security Guidelines - SGUD 
These guidelines cover the basic principles of security that are applied in all aspects of cybersecurity, 
such as Least Access and Separation of Duties.  This control also details the creation of clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities.   These guidelines are applicable across all aspects of the standard, 
and present a solid foundation of security principles.  This section also presents a challenge in terms 
of staff capability, as the requisite knowledge is highly specialised, causing the same issue as MLDP 












3.1.17 Health Data Storage and Confidentiality - STCF 
The security and confidentiality of health data at rest is highly dependent on the health delivery 
organisation’s interpretation of the requirements of jurisdictional regulations. Whilst there are some 
technical controls listed, this area relies almost entirely upon the ISO 27002 and ISO 27799 for 
technical controls. This area is theoretically effective, much like DIDT, however the implementation 
is difficult, as the health delivery organisation must abide by local legislation. This may cause 
confusion as the health delivery organisation will be required to spend resources to ascertain the 
pertinent regulations and apply the relevant controls.  
3.1.18 Transmission Confidentiality - TXCF 
The addition of transmission confidentiality is a limited control, and could possibly been seen as an 
afterthought. The technical controls listed lack specific guidance and control information and rely 
almost entirely on reference to local legislation. This is an omission with regards to effective 
direction in cybersecurity. 
This raises the question as to why X.509 is specified. If a health delivery organisation implements 
X.509, this section of the standard becomes redundant.  The specific mention of “Authenticated 
Nodes Only” should also be addressed.  As written, this assumes that all health data transmission 
will be undertaken only by authenticated “Nodes”. As a medical IT network is made up of a 
multitude of devices, both hardware and software, this is highly unlikely to be the case.  As such, 
major clarification in the wording and intended scope of node authentication should be applied, as 
this section may lead to a confusing and unhelpful application of controls.  The controls themselves 
benefit from the maturity of the subject, in similar fashion to AUTH. On their own, the controls 
provide an effective and robust control set, clarification of intended usage will allow for greater 
effectiveness. 
3.1.19 Transmission Integrity - TXIG 
The addition of transmission integrity suffers much the same as the TXCF capability, as it consists of 
a limited number of technical controls.  Whilst the listed technical controls would be effective, the 
usefulness and necessity of this section can be called into question, as there is little foreseeable 
benefit of specifically implementing this section. 
3.2 DISCUSSION 
Overall, the articulation of the 19 security capabilities in ISO/IEC 80001-2-2 to the technical controls 
in ISO/IEC 80001-2-8 is effective at providing a minimal measure of cybersecurity, with some 
capabilities more robust than others.  Whilst no completely ineffectual control areas were identified, 
there are significant areas for improvement.  Table 4 summarises the extent of potential 
improvement required in relation to cybersecurity protection.  
 
Effective Controls Controls with Minor 
Improvements Possible 
Controls with Major 
Improvement Required 
AUTH, ALOF, MLDP AUDT, CNFS, CSUP, IGAU, 
NAUT, PAUT, SAHD, SGUD, 
STFC 
DIDT, DTBK, EMRG, PLOK, 
RDMP, TXCF, TXIG 












As shown in Table 4, AUTH, ALOF and MLDP are effective, as the maturity and refinement of security 
practices over a long period of time.  As such, these capability areas are the most effective in the 
standard.  
Those requiring minor improvements (AUDT, CNFS, CSUP, IGAU, NAUT, PAUT, SAHD, SGUD, and 
STFC) have clear areas of omission, improvement or addition that would provide a more robust level 
of cybersecurity when addressed. Overall these provide adequate protection against cybersecurity 
incidents.   
The controls that require major improvement (DIDT, DTBK, EMRG, PLOK, RDMP, TXCF, TXIG),  may 
have been later additions to the capabilities list and therefore less well developed.  This is due to 
either a lack of content, misleading or confusing outcomes, lack of implementation guidance or 
ineffective controls.   
A potentially more important consideration is the compound impact of multiple ineffective and 
incomplete cybersecurity controls in one system. As cybersecurity is applied to a system, a single 
weakness creates a compounding issue.  Whilst this is most prevalent in cybersecurity incidents, 
there exists potential for this to impact patient safety. 
A large section of the standard is left to health delivery organisation internal policy and adherence to 
the laws and regulations of their jurisdiction. In addition, the overall effectiveness of the standard 
remains dependent on the organisation for adherence and completeness of implementation. 
Without acknowledgement of this as a potential issue, organisations (particularly those without 
cybersecurity expertise) may be left unnecessarily vulnerable to cybersecurity incidents.   
4 CONCLUSION 
The research analysed and compared ISO/IEC 80001 technical guidance with contemporary 
cybersecurity best practice, with the aim of identifying the completeness of this technical guidance. 
Initial review of the guidelines and standards in the sphere of cybersecurity related to medical 
devices on IT networks, provided the identification of the essential security principles concerning 
cybersecurity protection.  This initial review formed the basis from which to draw comparisons 
between the technical controls in ISO/IEC 80001-2-8 and cybersecurity best practice. In critically 
analysing the controls, deconstruction of each control was necessary to assess its effectiveness in 
providing cybersecurity protective measures. This analysis and comparison included identification of 
controls that were effective, out of place, ambiguous or in need of improvement. 
ISO/IEC 80001 currently allows for an effective baseline of security against potential cyber incidents. 
Whilst there are areas that need improvement, the current technical controls and guidance can be 
said to be ‘adequate’.  The issue of balancing the agnostic nature of an international standard with 
the in-depth technical information needed for effective cybersecurity protection is an issue for the 
ISO TC215 Joint Working Group 7 to review and ultimately for implementers to address. 
One measure may be the creation of a framework that tests the implementation of the standard 
against the practical application of cybersecurity best practice. Such a framework would allow those 
responsible for the secure management of the network to identify the flaws before an incident, and 
subsequently contribute to the overarching goal of patient safety when using medical devices. This 












The knowledge generated during this research was through the synthesis and analysis of existing 
frameworks and established cybersecurity practices.  The research extends the work already done 
on ISO/IEC 80001-2-8 by providing a lens of cybersecurity protection rather than risk assessment.   In 
doing this, a broader and more practical perspective on the protections described in ISO/IEC 80001 is 
provided together with recommendations for improving the standard.  
From the perspective of research and scholarship, the contribution is to the International Standards 
Community, through Joint Working Group 7 (JWG7). This research contributes to the current 
redevelopment of the ISO/IEC 80001 series by providing areas that can be taken under consideration 
for action during the redevelopment process.  In turn, by addressing the issues identified, this allows 
a greater level of credibility to the standard.  This may indirectly lead to a greater adoption rate, as 
the standard is seen an effective measure to implement.  
Indirectly, this research impacts the patients serviced by a health delivery organisation. Whilst the 
standard certification and implementation process itself is invisible to the patients, the result of 
increased cybersecurity helps to prevent a loss of confidence in their health delivery organisation’s 
and their ability to provide effective care, by applying the risk reduction and mitigation factors that 
are present in ISO/IEC 80001.  As the challenges that occur in the medical IT world are unique and 
evolving as cybersecurity threats evolve, a systematic and complete approach to using standards 
such as ISO/IEC80001 becomes imperative to provide effective protection of the technology as well 
as patient safety.  
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